Introduction
In this article, I critically review the impact of district magnitude on strategic voting as stated in Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories: in proportional representation (PR) systems with large districts (i.e. greater than five seats), strategic voting is not possible because voters do not have good enough expectations about how well each party or candidate is likely to do in the upcoming election (Cox, 1997; Cox and Shugart, 1996) .
I argue that the necessary informational requirements for voting strategically in large districts are surprisingly low. Voters only need to know whether the party they prefer has some chance of winning at least one seat in their district. Given that they have too small a stake in elections to collect information, voters may muddle through, however, relying on a shortcut such as the electoral history heuristic (i.e. expectations about the likely outcome of the election grounded in simple extrapolations from the previous one).
The heuristic voters employ in t is simply the viability of their preferred party in their district in the previous election or, in other words, whether their preferred party gained at least one seat in their district in t-1. When electoral expectations are formed in accordance with this shortcut, strategic voting can also be possible in large districts, since this information is as cheap to come by there as in less than five-seat districts.
This argument is not new. Reed (1991) , for example, has shown that the connection between electoral system and behaviour in Japan has been learning and not instrumental rationality. Forsythe et al. (1993) found that election histories, or the results of previous elections, enable majority voters to coordinate on one of their favoured candidates. Gschwend (2005) and Gschwend et al. (2004) recently provided aggregated evidence that strategic voting can be observed in PR systems with large district magnitudes (Portugal and Finland) . Using survey and in-depth elite interview data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, I make two contributions in this article. First, I examine how voters form expectations about the candidates' or parties' vote shares. Second, I provide a systematic assessment of the merits of these two explanations of strategic voting based on rational expectations and election histories.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 is a detailed account of the theoretical arguments behind the formation of electoral expectations; Section 3 is my case study of the 1979 and the 1982 Spanish elections; the empirical analysis in Section 4 has two stages -the first establishing how expectations are formed, the second developing two approaches for modelling strategic voting based on rational expectations and heuristics; in Section 5, I examine whether perceptions, calculations and strategies of party elites support these two models; and in Section 6 I draw some conclusions.
Theoretical Arguments
Electoral systems affect the coordination of political forces within districts when candidates or parties enter the race and voters distribute their votes among them. If the prospective competitors in a district are all primarily interested in winning a seat in the upcoming election, but will not enter if their chances are not good enough, then electoral coordination may end at the elite level. However, when some minor-party or independent candidate enters regardless of their chances of winning, then voters may have the incentive to vote strategically. The general finding is embodied in the M+1 rule, which states that, under certain conditions, strategic voting will reduce contests by more than M+1 candidates or parties in contests in which at most M+1 competitors are seriously in the running for seats (Cox, 1997 (Cox, , 1999 .
The two key assumptions concern voters' preferences and beliefs: voters are short-term instrumentally rational (i.e. they care only about who wins the seats in their district in the upcoming election) and have rational expectations, and when this is the case (1) they agree on how preferences are distributed in the electorate, (2) they agree on what share of the vote each party or candidate is likely to get and, therefore, (3) they are able to distinguish between the expected last winner of the last allocated seat and the expected first loser (Cox, 1997: Chs 4 and 5) . 1 Consequently, the rational expectations condition implies, on the one hand, that voters have full (or almost full) information about the electoral prospects of parties or candidates in the upcoming election, and, on the other, about district magnitude. If strategic voting is only possible when voters can anticipate the allocation of seats, knowledge of the number of members elected from their districts is crucial, especially when there is a wide variation in district magnitude within an electoral system and when the number (and identity) of viable competitors is not a constant. 2 Strategic voting should decline as voters' expectations about who will win and lose are less clear and coordinated -the larger the magnitude, the smaller the voter percentages that separate winners from losers. Hence, the harder it is to be sure who is 'out of the running' in these conditions, the fewer incentives there are to desert (minor) parties. This argument does not give a very precise idea about when strategic voting ought to fade out, as Cox (1997: 100) recognizes, but it seems to be above magnitude 5 according to empirical regularities based on Japanese, Colombian and Spanish districtlevel results (Cox, 1997: Ch. 5; Cox and Shugart, 1996) .
Nevertheless, six decades of survey research in the wake of Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet's The People's Choice have convincingly demonstrated how little attention citizens pay to politics, how rarely they think about even major issues, and how often they have failed to work through a consistent position on them (see Kinder [1983] or Sniderman [1993] ). For instance, voters cannot recall basic political facts (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1991), they do not have a solid understanding of ideological abstractions (Converse, 1964) and they fail to recognize the names of their elected representatives (Montero and Gunther, 1994; Neuman, 1986) . In short, the assumption of rational expectations is hardly sustainable in view of the findings of survey research.
However, this limited information need not prevent people from making reasoned choices or decisions based on accurate predictions about the consequences of a given decision (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998: 18) . Although encyclopaedic knowledge is beyond their reach, the public may muddle through, relying on a variety of sensible and mostly adaptive shortcuts. Heuristics are therefore judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways of organizing and simplifying political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable solutions even to complex problems of choice (Sniderman et al., 1991: 19) . The numerous possible heuristics include opinion leaders (Berelson et al., 1954) , party identification (Downs, 1957) , campaign events (Popkin, 1991) , costly action (Lupia, 1992) , the media (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) , interpersonal influence (Beck et al., 2002) , social relations (Huckfeldt, 2001) , or the political environment (Kuklinski et al., 2001) .
What I defend here is a weak version of rationality. Voters have limits to their ability to comprehend a complex environment such as elections and therefore need to rely on shortcuts if they are to form electoral expectations. They can solve coordination problems posed by electoral systems through identifying a focal point (Schelling, 1960: Ch. 3), which is the most prevalent solution to coordination problems (Richards, 2001 ). Schelling surmised that coordination could occur if there was some shared interpretation of the salient features of a decision context. People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same.
Elections provide a very simple clue for coordinating behaviour: whether parties have previously gained at least one seat in a given district. Consequently, in order to form their electoral expectations and vote strategically, supporters of (minor) parties only have to look back to previous elections. When their most preferred party was not viable in their district in election in t-1, there is an opportunity or an incentive for strategic voting in election in t. But given the negligible influence of a vote on the final outcome (Meehl, 1977; Riker, 1982) , the process is mediated by elites (activists, contributors, parties or candidates), who provide the information on the focal point and the wasted vote argument.
Contrary to what Cox (1997) defends, the most important consequence of this logic of electoral coordination is that strategic voting does not depend on district magnitude: voters can also behave strategically in large districts, since the information on previous election results is also available in these cases. However, the higher the district magnitude, the higher the number of viable parties, and therefore the extent of strategic voting will tend to decrease. In short, there is correlation between district magnitude and strategic voting, but it is caused by a third variable, namely the existence of viable minor parties.
Strategic Voting in Spain
Spain, Finland, Portugal and Switzerland are the European contemporary democracies with the highest district magnitude variation (Monroe and Rose, 2002: 75) . Elections in Spain are held following the D'Hondt formula and closed lists in 52 districts between 1 and 35 seats. There is a 3 percent threshold at the district level. Over the period 1979-96, the Spanish system has consistently been among the least proportional of all European electoral systems (Lijphart, 1999: 162) . One of the primary features that fuel this disproportionality is the presence of many districts of small magnitude (30 districts or 58 percent with magnitude 5 or less in the previous election). The interaction between this huge magnitude variation and the existence of a third party, the Communist Party (the PCE) and its heir, the United Left (the IU), provides a very appropriate setting for testing strategic voting (Table 1) .
The evidence of voters' strategic behaviour found by Gunther (1989) in the 1979 and 1982 Spanish elections is important confirmation of the theoretical results presented by Cox (1997) . On the one hand, it demonstrates that strategic voting is also possible in multi-member districts, while, on the other, it shows that strategic voting fades out when district magnitude is greater than five given that it gets harder and harder to satisfy the informational assumptions of the model (Cox, 1997: 115-17) . According to Gunther (1989: 841- 
Spain's electoral system has given rise to a considerable amount of sophisticated or strategic voting [. . .] What is more striking is the apparent ability of Spanish voters to determine the threshold levels separating provinces in which their preferred party had a fair chance of receiving parliamentary representation from those in which their votes would have been 'wasted' [. . .] Respondents with highly favourable attitudes toward the third-and fourth-place parties in large provinces were about twice as likely to vote for them as sympathizers of those same parties in small provinces [. . .] This threshold level is reflected in the voting behavior of the PCE sympathizers: among respondents rating the Communist party at 9 or 10 in the feeling thermometer in 1979, 52% of those residing in provinces electing five or more deputies actually cast ballots for the PCE [. . .] while in provinces electing only three or 4 deputies [. . .] only 25% did so [. . .] Similarly, [in the 1982 election] a significant number of Communist party sympathizers residing in small provinces were discouraged from voting for their first choice; just 33% of those 'very close' to the PCE who lived in provinces electing five or fewer deputies cast ballots for the Communist party, while 61% of those residing in large provinces did so. 
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Empirical Analysis: Rational Expectations or Heuristics?
The first stage of the inquiry is in establishing how expectations are formed. 3 Do Spanish voters know the number of seats to be filled and/or the previous results of the PCE/IU in their district? Tables 2, 3 and 4 display the numbers and percentages providing a correct answer to each question in a postelection survey conducted in 2004. 4 As can be seen from Table 2 , only 86 individuals, or 3 percent, knew the district magnitude in the 2004 election. This percentage is slightly higher in districts equal to or below magnitude 5 (8.5 percent versus 1.4 percent). When an error of ±1 seat is allowed, the results are similar (Table 3) . However, 2,193 individuals, or 75 percent, knew whether the PCE/IU gained seats in his/her electoral district in the 2004 election (Table 4) . Again, this percentage is slightly higher in districts equal to or below magnitude 5 (90.3 percent versus 70.5 percent).
In sum, the vast majority of Spanish voters know whether the IU is locally viable according to the previous election in their district, but very few know the district magnitude in the upcoming election. Therefore, voters can employ (Cox, 1997: 100; Cox and Shugart, 1996: 311) , this implies that the informational requirements for voting strategically are satisfied in large districts, too. The second stage of the analysis is in assessing for each respondent whether his/her vote was sincere or strategic. The results obtained using a model of strategic voting based on rational expectations are compared with those produced by a model that relies on heuristics. I develop a specification of vote choice concerning the decision to support the PSOE or the PCE in the 1979 and 1982 elections. Three reasons explain why I look only at those who voted for these parties in these two elections. First, the evidence of strategic voting in Spain provided by Gunther (1989) and Cox (1997) corresponds to that of the 1979 and 1982 elections and particularly to the PCE sympathizers. Second, the PCE/IU has been the third party in the nine elections held until now and the main victim of strategic voting. Third, apart from the Popular Alliance (AP) in the 1979 election, there are not enough observations in the post-election surveys for analysis of the strategic behaviour of those preferring smaller parties.
It is presumed that the electoral decision is dependent on evaluations of the parties and the leaders, the economy, some issues in each election, sociodemographic characteristics and the incentives for strategic voting (the variables are described in the Appendix). My model of sincere voting provides a vehicle controlling for all the important perspectives on Spanish electoral behaviour simultaneously; this allows me to test strategic voting without worrying about competing effects. The dependent variable is indicated as voting behaviour: 1 for the PSOE and 0 for the PCE. The analysis is based on two large post-election surveys -one conducted in 1979, the other in 1982. 5 Since the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Álvarez and Nagler, 1998) can be accepted according to the Hausman test (Long and Freese, 2001: 188-90) , I use a binomial logit estimation. The full binomial logit results from the estimation of these models are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . The results for the effects of issues, economic perceptions and demographic factors are similar to those presented in previous works on these same elections, so interested readers are referred to that research. 6 All I wish to draw attention to here is that most of the variables are signed in theoretically expected manner; many are statistically significant, and these models correctly classify more than 90 percent of the reported votes cast by the more than 1,000 voters in the samples.
The important coefficients for my purposes are those on the three strategic voting variables. I expect the two dummies, M > 5 (1 if district magnitude is equal to or less than five seats, 0 otherwise) and Seat (1 for the districts where the PCE did not gain seats in the previous election, 0 otherwise), 7 to be positively signed and District Magnitude (in seats) negatively signed -the higher the number of seats to be filled in a district, or in the districts where the PCE was viable in the previous election, the fewer the opportunities or the incentives to cast a strategic vote.
Even though there are control variables in the models to account for all the factors that lead someone to prefer the PCE over the PSOE, they could be insufficient. The variable Seat might simply reflect some of the residual differences in the balance of support for the two parties between districts where the PCE did and did not gain a seat. Or, in other words, the PCE/IU performs badly in districts where it performed badly in the past.
There are several reasons to reject the notion that the variable Seat just means that support for the PSOE versus PCE/IU is autocorrelated over time. First, according to Lago (2005) , only in four of the seven elections held in the period 1979 to 2000 were the previous results of the PCE (defined in these terms) statistically significant in explaining the fraction of left-wing voters that support the PSOE rather than the PCE/IU. In these four elections, strategic voting played a crucial role in the PSOE's campaign strategy. Moreover, in the 1993 election this variable has a negative sign: the PSOE's share of the left-wing vote was lower where the PCE did badly in the previous election. Second, the correlation between the PCE support in a district and winning a seat there shows significant differences across elections. In the 1979 election, the correlation is 0.80, but only 0.45 in 1982. Similarly, the correlation between winning a seat in a given district in the 1982 election and the PCE/IU's vote shares at the district level in the 1986 election, for instance, is surprisingly low: 0.37. Finally, in the 1982 election the PCE vote share was higher in five districts where it did not win seats than in Madrid and Barcelona, two of the four districts where it won seats. And the same Note: Estimation is by maximum-likelihood. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; **p < 0.1. pta = pesetas. the analysis is based on counterfactual simulation. I calculate the proportion of voters who would have voted differently if they had not taken party viability in their district into account. 9 I first predict the party that each respondent was most likely to support using the full models presented above (i.e. including the strategic voting variables): this is my prediction of a voter's strategic vote. Second, I predict the party each individual was most likely to support when the incentives for strategic behaviour disappear, that is, if the variables M > 5 or Seat had been zero (i.e. all voters are in districts above magnitude 5 or where the IU gained at least one seat in the previous election). 10 Rows in the tables correspond to predicted party support when all variables, including the strategic voting variables, are incorporated within the model. Columns correspond to the predicted vote when the coefficients of the strategic voting variables are set at zero. All cases along the main diagonal are instances where the two predictions converge: these are individuals who would not have voted differently if they had considered only their preferences. The off-diagonal entries are strategic voters who would have made a different choice if their vote had been purely sincere. According to these estimations, 0.9 percent of my sample cast a strategic vote in the 1979 election when the theoretical model is based on rational expectations (i.e. strategic voting fades out when district magnitude is greater than 5) and 1.6 percent when it rests on heuristics (i.e. strategic voting is also possible in large districts). Note: Entries are number of respondents, with column percentages in parentheses. In the 1982 election, 0.6 percent of my sample cast a strategic vote when voters' behaviour is based on electoral history heuristics. But there is no evidence of electoral coordination when strategic voting is a function of the number of deputies elected in each district (Table 9) . Briefly, there seems to have been much less strategic voting in the 1982 election than in the 1979 election. Given that the potential group of PCE supporters is composed of no more than 9 percent of the voters in the samples, and taking into account the PCE's vote shares in both elections, only 0.9 percent of the electorate in the former case and 0.3 in the latter cast a strategic vote. There appears to have been relatively little strategic voting in Spanish elections.
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Parties and Strategic Voting
Strategic voting depends not just on voters, but also on elite actors. As Cox recognizes, strategic voting survives in theory and practice because the process is mediated by elites. They point out that the race is close and that votes on weak candidates are wasted. Voters do the rest: they buy the argument and act accordingly (Cox, 1997: 90, 98) . In this section, I examine the extent to which party strategies support my argument, i.e. local viability in the previous election, and not district magnitude, is the key variable explaining strategic voting. My analysis is based on extensive in-depth interviews with relevant elites of the four most important national parties in Spain during the period 1977-2004: the dominant centrist party in the 1970s, the UCD, the PSOE, the minor right-wing party in the 1970s and dominant since then, the AP/PP, and the PCE/IU. In particular, I interviewed Óscar Alzaga (the UCD), Félix Martínez de la Cruz (the PCE/IU), Ignacio Varela (the PSOE) and José Ignacio Wert (the AP/PP). 11 The wasted vote argument can only be exploited by parties possessing the focal point characteristic in a given district being viable. Therefore, district magnitude is not the decisive variable, as Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories defend. Campaign strategies of large parties in Spain roundly support this assertion. In accordance with the UCD leaders:
[S]trategic voting appeals cannot be the same in Madrid, a thirty-fourseat district, and in Segovia, a three-seat district. Strategic voting has a series of very defined messages. In a small district, without representation of the AP [the minor intra-bloc competitor of the UCD in the 1970s], you try to explain to the AP supporters that their vote is wasted; you try to explain to them the rules of the game. Individuals whose vote is exclusively expressive are rare. Most of them wish that their vote had some influence. Then, what you explain in Segovia is totally different to what you explain in Madrid. What you [the PSOE and the UCD] explained in Segovia in 1979 is that before 1979 election votes for the PCE and the AP were not translated into seats. Therefore, it was a thrown away vote [. . .] Voters strongly predisposed to support the AP or the PCE do not respond to the wasted vote argument, because they will always vote for their preferred party. On the contrary, in Madrid, Barcelona or large districts, where you need to amass not too many votes to gain a seat, or in the small districts where the AP had seats, the wasted vote argument is different. You cannot say 'do not vote for the AP because it will not win seats'. The argument is 'what is at stake is which party will rule'. Then, the argument is different [. . .] In Segovia what you explain is how the D'Hondt formula operates. You do not explain the same in Madrid. In Madrid the campaign is focused on the national leaders. You have to show who has possibilities to rule and who does not. Then, it is a wasted vote argument, but different. Because it is not the problem of influence, because the vote does not count on the distribution of seats, but it is much more useful to decide who rules. You change your speech. 12 In Ignacio Varela's view:
[A]lthough the wasted vote argument is used in all the districts, it is true that in some of them vote dispersion was more detrimental for us than in others. In districts where there was a significant presence of other leftist parties that, however, were not able to win seats, the problem was specially dramatic. Avoiding the wasted vote on the left has been our priority. It is easier to convince voters that they are wasting their vote or benefiting the opposition when their votes are not going to be translated into seats. That is, in districts where the IU, for example, did not have seats and did not have good possibilities, independently of their magnitude. Therefore, in districts of seven, eight or nine seats where the IU got significant percentages of 8 or 10 percent of votes, that were not enough to win a seat but, however, added to the PSOE they had given us another seat [. . .] this acquires a crucial importance. 13 As the campaign manager of the PCE/IU points out, 'where strategic voting works is in districts where we do not have seats: 37 districts'. 14 Finally, when asked about such a campaign strategy, Wert responded that 'I would tend to support that strategic voting appeals across districts mainly depends on the fact that the minor party had or not representation and not on district magnitude'. 15
Conclusions
In this article, I have demonstrated that strategic voting in PR systems does not depend on rational expectations, but on heuristics. In order to form electoral expectations, voters can employ the electoral history heuristic (i.e. the viability of their preferred party in their district in the previous election). First, I have shown that very few people in the 2004 Spanish election knew how many seats were elected in their districts. On the contrary, the vast majority knew the focal point that solves coordination problems in mass elections: whether (minor) parties have previously gained at least one seat in a given district. Second, these two approaches were applied to the analysis of the 1979 and 1982 elections in Spain. Both found a significant extent of strategic voting in the 1979 election: according to the model based on rational expectations, 4.6 percent of PCE sympathizers cast a strategic vote, while for the explanation that relies on heuristics this percentage is 8.9. But the divergence is particularly important in the 1982 election. When electoral coordination depends on rational expectations, there is no evidence of strategic voting. However, when it is a function of heuristics, 8.5 percent of PCE supporters voted strategically. The main conclusion from this research is that strategic voting is observable across all districts, and not just in small ones.
Coup d'état: 1 for those who think that a coup d'état is probable: 0 for the remaining individuals.
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1 These conditions are not implied by any standard notion of instrumental rationality or rational expectations. In the formal model of Myatt (2000) or Fisher (1999 Fisher ( , 2004 , for instance, voters are uncertain of the support levels for the parties. 2 The rational expectations assumption is a necessary condition for Cox's theory to be useful, whether this assumption is correct or not. However, formal models do not constitute verified explanations without empirical evaluation of their predictions. In other words, we cannot take untested or unjustified theoretical assumptions and use them in constructing empirical research designs (King et al., 1994: 105-6) . 3 This analysis is focused on the 2004 election. Unfortunately, the information is not available for more elections. 7 Obviously, what should matter is whether the person thinks that the PCE had no seat in the previous election, not the objective reality. But this subjective information is not available in either the pre-election or post-election surveys. 8 See also Blais et al. (2005) . 9 Although there is a very interesting debate on the use of direct or indirect methods in predicting the aggregate amount of strategic voting (Álvarez and Nagler, 2000; Blais et al., 2005; Evans, 2002; Fisher, 2004) , in Spain the direct approach based on respondents' reported preferences and behaviour is not possible: surveys do not have the required information. 10 Since M > 5 is not statistically significant in the analysis of the 1982 election, it has not been taken into account in my simulations. 11 Óscar Alzaga was one of the fathers of the electoral system, deputy of the UCD (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) and the AP/PP (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) 
